STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND {D-SC) ON SENATE FLOOR UPON
INTRODUCTION OF BILL TO AUTHORIZE AND ESTABLISH A FEDERAL INDUSTRIAL
SECURITY PROGRAM,~~JO, 1959•

Mr. President, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision
in the case of Greene

v.

McElroy . et al, delivered on June 29,

1959, our country is without any effective industrial security
program.

It is imperative that the Congress act immediately to

overcome the result of this decision 1 and to protect the internal
security of the country.
The Department of Defense has long had an industrial security
program, as have other government agencies and departments.
These departments and agencies have specified in their contracts
with contractors that no classified information was to be revealed,
and no access to areas where classified projects were conducted
was to be permitted, to any person not given security clearance
by the Government department or agency.

Pursuant to such con

tractual provisions, the departments and agencies have granted
and declined security clearances to employees of their contractors.
In determining whether clearances should be granted or declined,
the various agencies and departments of Government have carefully
avoided damaging the Government's security program/by not revealing
the identification of the sources of their information.

In so

doing, the person for whom the security clearance was sought/has
often not been confronted with the witnesses who gave information
on his case, nor has such person been given access to all the
- 1-

information/ which is available to the department or agency which
determines the matter.
The Greene Ease was probably a typical example.

Greene was

the executive Vice-President of a contractor of the Department
of Defense.

He was an aeronautical engineer.

clearances for classified work.
was revokedo

He had had prior

In 1954 his security clearance

Since his employer was almost exclusively working

on contracts for the Government, the contractor had no further
need for his services / and he was discharged.

Greene was unable

to find other employment in his field / and brought an action to
have the denial of a security clearance declared unlawful.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals decided adversely
to Greene, but the Supreme Court reversed the lower Courts and
grantee Greene's petition.
During the conduct of the proceedings to determine whether
the security clearance should or should not be grapted, Greene
was not confronted with the agents who had furnished the informa
tion against him, nor was he given access to all of the specifics
of the reports concerning his activities.
The Supreme Court based its invalidation of the Department
of Defense Industrial Security Program/ on the narrow ground of
lack of authorization of the program/ by either Congress or the
President.

The majority opinion of the court reasoned that neither

Congressional nor Presidential authorization could be inferred /ror
a proce1_dure which did not provide the traditional safeguards /
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usually thought ·of in the context of procedural "due process"-to be precise, the right of a person to be confronted with the
witnesses against him for cross-examination, and to have access
to all specifics of the charges against him.

The Supreme Court

pointedly declined to express any view / as to whether the procedures
used in the case at hand/ would have been in violation of the
Constitution / had they been authorized specifically by Congress
and the President.

Thus, while admitting the authority of the

Department of Defense to establish an industrial security program..,..J
by virtue of Executive Order No. 1~01 and inferred ~ngressional
approval, the Court declined to infer from the same actions/an
authorization to conduct the pro gram in such a manner / as to deny
the traditional and historical procedures of due process.
I would be the last to criticize the Court / for declining to
infer authorizations for executive departments and agencies.

Such

inferences could be extremely dangerous, and we are all most
acutely aware/ that the departments and agencies are granted or
assume the widest authorizations as it is.
1

Nevertheless, I am convinced that the decision is wrong.

The

Court has failed to distinguish between/what is a matter of right
with the individual, and what is, at the greatest, a matter of
privile#ge.

This case did not deal with the ri ght of an individual

to hold a job /4r to preserve any ri ght guaranteed to him by the
Constitution.

It involved solely the question /o r whether an
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individual should have access to properly classified information/
presumably in the exclusive control of the Government.
,

'

such circumstances, the Government ha~ the

Under

right to determine

who, and under what conditions persons shall receive classified
information.

The loss of employment which occured in this

instance, and undoubtedly in others, was incidental to the
decision of the Department of Defense/to deny such information
to Greene.

Since no right of the individual was involved, the

procedure utilized by the Department of Defense/in arriving at
the decision/ is and was immaterial.

Justice Clark wisely noted

this distinction / in his dissenting opinion.
Regardless of whether we agree or disagree, individually,
with the rationale of the Supreme Court's opinion, the fact
remains / that the country is now without any effective industrial
security program.

The existing procedure could be made effective/

only through compromise of our entire security program/oy the
process of nburning informant& and agents."

The burden rests

squarely on the Congress to remedy the situation.
For the reasons stated, Mr. President, I send to the desk
a bill to authorize and establish a Federal Industrial Security
Programe

In drafting this measure, I have relied heavily on

the recommendations of the Commission on Government Security,
published in June 1957.

The bill I propose would establish

specific criteria/for granting or denying clearances.

It would

deal with the questions of confrontation and cross-examination
I

forthrightly.

While granting the maximum degree of safeguards for

the individual, this proposal would also protect the identity of
agents in the security program, and thereby, the security program
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itself.
I fervently hope that the committees and the Congress will
expedite action in this field/4o that Congress may meet its
responsibility in full/on thi_s vital question prior to adjournment.
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